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Abstract
This paper analyses a two-sidedmarket in which two platforms compete against each
other. One side, the advertisers, exerts a negative externality on the other side, the
users. It is shown that if platforms can charge advertisers only, a higher degree of
competition for users can lead to higher profits because competition on the advertis-
ers’ side is reduced. If platforms can charge users as well, profits might increase or
decrease, the latter because of increased competition through the additional instru-
ment of the user fee. Nevertheless the equilibrium with user fee is more efficient.
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1 Introduction
There are many markets where companies produce services for a group of agents
who do not pay for it or pay only a low price. Instead these companies get rev-
enues from advertisers who wish to gain access to potential consumers via the ser-
vices of these companies. Examples are private radio or television stations1 which
often interrupt their programme to broadcast advertisement.2 Search engines like
Google or Yahoo! or internet portals like GMX often have a multitude of adver-
tisements on their web sites.3 In the case of radio it is technically impossible to
charge listeners for the broadcasting of programmes. In the case of search engines
it is not customary to charge users for the services.
This paper studies a model of platform competition in which users dislike adver-
tisement and therefore spend less time to consume services of platforms. On the
other hand advertisers wish to gain users’ attention to tempt them to buy their
products. In equilibrium the level of advertising might be too high or too low
compared with the socially optimal one because platform pricing does not inter-
nalise the externality which is exerted on users by more advertising. Concerning
platform profits a higher degree of competition for users can increase profits be-
cause price competition becomes less fierce. Thus a different level of competition
on one side influences the level of competition on the other side and may have
consequences on profits which are opposite to the one in a one-sided market. If
platforms can charge users as well there might be an incentive to subsidise users,
i.e. set a negative fee, to attract more users. But since both platforms do so this
strategic effect lowers their profits. A prisoner’s dilemma situation arises. But if
the user fee is positive in equilibrium the additional instrument increases profits.
1To get an idea of the expenditures on advertising, in the US in 2002 approximately $ 50 billion
were spent on TV advertising (Kind, Nilssen & Sorgard (2003)) and a thirty second commercial on
FOX had an average price of $ 150,000 (Prime Time Pricing Survey, The Advertising Age (2002)).
2In the US advertising time ranged from approximately 10 to 15 minutes per hour in 1999 (Tele-
vision Commercial Monitoring Report (1999)).
3For an internet portal advertising is the most important source of revenue since it does not
charge users. For example, the internet portal GMX sells a banner on its web site for 20,000 Euros
per week (http://www.gmx.de).
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The equilibrium with fees for both sides of the market is always efficient. The rea-
son is that with the user fee platforms do now take into account users’ utility in
their pricing behaviour.
More specifically, we assume that two platforms compete for user time and adver-
tisers. For the advertisers platforms are completely similar while platforms com-
pete for users in a standard Hotelling style. Both sides of the market choose only
one platform.4 Profits of advertisers are increasing in the time users spend on a
platform. Users’ utility and the time they spend on a platform are decreasing with
advertising.5 Therefore an advertiser causes a negative externality on users of that
platform directly and also on all other advertisers on that platform indirectly. If
the gains from trading advertisers’ goods are high compared to users’ utility loss
all producers should advertise from a social point of view. If the utility loss is high
some of the advertisers should be excluded. The optimal partition of advertisers
among platforms is even. The intuition is that if one platform has more than half
of the advertisers the externality on all of them is high and can be reduced if some
advertisers shift to the other platform.
In a Nash equilibrium the number of advertisers on both platforms is the same but
might be too high or too low compared with efficiency. Platforms only internalise
the indirect externality that one advertiser exerts on other advertisers but not the
direct utility loss of users. This is the case because this externality is incorporated
in their pricing behaviour while the externality on users does not influence prices.
So if the degree of differentiation between platforms is low competition for users
is fierce. But platforms compete for users by reducing their advertisement lev-
els. Thus with low differentiation there is little advertising on platforms. But if
the gains from trading advertisers’ goods are high this level of advertising is too
low compared with the social optimum. If instead platforms are highly differenti-
ated they will lose only few users if they advertise more. In this case the level of
4The assumption that advertisers single-home (use only one platform) is not crucial to the re-
sults but simplifies the modeling. See the next section for a longer discussion.
5Ferrando, Gabszewicz, Laussel & Sonnac (2003) analyse a model in which some people are
advertisement-avoiders while others are advertisement-lovers. But normally commercials are con-
sidered a nuisance for users. See Bagwell (2003) or Dukes & Gal-Or (2002).
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advertising is too high.
Platforms’ profits depend on the level of differentiation as well. If differentiation
is relatively high profits fall with an increase in differentiation. The intuition is
that platforms have a higher incentive to attract advertisers because users do not
switch easily to the other platform. This results in lower prices for advertising.
But since both platforms lower their prices the level of advertising stays the same
while profits are decreasing. So the strategic effect hurts platforms. This shows
that in a two-sided market a lower level of competition on one side can increase
the competition on the other side and lead to lower profits. If differentiation is low
and competition for users is fierce an increase in the differentiation leads to rising
profits. The reason is that advertising levels are low and with a price decrease this
level rises, which increases profits.
I also analyse what happens if platforms can charge a user fee. If this user fee
is unrestricted, e.g. can either be positive or negative, the efficient outcome is
reached. With the possibility of a user fee platforms have two different instruments
at hand to make profits. They therefore take users’ utility into account as well.
Since platforms compete for both sides this leads to the efficient outcome.
In equilibrium it might be the case that this user fee is negative because platforms
want to attract users in order to make more profits on advertisers. In this case the
additional instrument of a user fee hurts platforms and their profits are lower. If
the user fee is positive profits are higher than without a user fee. If the fee is re-
stricted to be positive the efficient outcome cannot be reached in general but only
in the case when the user charge would be positive in equilibrium.
Most of the papers in the two-sided markets literature are concerned with par-
ticipants exerting positive externalities on each other like in the market for credit
cards. Examples of these papers are Rochet & Tirole (2003) or Wright (2003). In
Section 6 of their paper Rochet & Tirole (2003) briefly analyse a model in which
platforms earn revenues from users and advertisers. Platforms are able to use a
two-part tariff for both groups of participants. Rochet & Tirole (2003) show that in
general both prices depend on the relations between own- and cross-price elastic-
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ities.6
Recently there has been a growing literature on platform competition for adver-
tisers. A seminal contribution to this literature is the paper of Anderson & Coate
(2003). They analyse a model of TV broadcasting and are interested in the ques-
tion whether two channels will offer the same or different programmes and how
much advertisement they will broadcast. They find that dependent on parameter
values there can be too little but also too much advertising and also too low or
too high a variety of programmes. In their model viewers suffer from advertising
with the consequence that they switch to their less preferred programme if this
has fewer advertisements. As a result an even distribution of advertisers on plat-
forms is efficient because otherwise some viewers would not watch their preferred
programme.
My paper revisits their first result in a different type of model. The difference to
their paper is that in my model platforms compete directly for advertisers while
in their model a change in the commercial price of channel 1 does not influence
the commercial price of channel 2. This allows me to analyse the consequences of
different degrees of competition on one side for the degree of competition on the
other side and on platforms’ profits. Anderson & Coate (2003) also analyse the
case in which viewers can be charged for watching the programmes. They find
that advertising levels are usually lower in this case.
Kind, Nilssen & Sorgard (2003) analyse the broadcasting market as well and are
also concerned with the question if competition between channels leads to over-
or underprovision of commercials. Like Anderson & Coate (2003) they do not
assume direct competition for advertisers. Kind, Nilssen& Sorgard (2003) also find
that there can be underprovision of advertising for low degrees of differentiation
between platforms. They show as well that a merger between the two channels
can improve welfare as it leads to more advertisements.7
6For a detailed overview how to model different forms of competition and externalities in two-
sided markets see Armstrong (2004). For a model with a monopoly platform see Baye & Morgan
(2001).
7A paper with a similar basic model is Barros, Kind & Sorgard (2003). They are interested in
the consequences of a vertical merger between a platform and a producer. They show that such a
merger can be harmful for both firms. This is the case if platforms are close substitutes because the
independent platform acts as a free rider on the merger and increases its advertising price.
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In a paper of Gal-Or & Dukes (2003) differentiated TV or radio stations also com-
pete for viewers/listeners. They analyse the conditions under which a merger of
two stations can be profitable. In their model consumers are averse to advertising
but may profit from advertisements by the fact that they are better informed about
prices.8 If two firms merge this results in a higher level of advertising which can
drive producers’ prices and profits down. Therefore producers can pay less for
advertising. This might render a merger unprofitable.
In contrast to the above cited papers my paper analyse a model with competition
for both sides, users and advertisers, and not only users. I look at the consequences
on pricing behaviour and profits of platforms. As is shown this behaviour can be
very different in a two-sided market compared with a one-sided one and also has
different effects than competition for only one side.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section sets out the
basic model. In Section 3 the efficient outcome is presented. Section 4 analyses the
equilibrium and compares it with efficiency. Section 5 presents the equilibrium
with the possibility of a user charge. In Section 6 an example of pricing behaviour
of internet portals is given. A short conclusion is given in Section 7.
2 The Model
The goal is to develop a model in which platforms compete for users (consumers)
and advertisers (producers). It is assumed that if platforms are internet portals, ra-
dio stations, or television channels consumers have the hardware to get access to
these platforms. Advertising causes a negative externality on users but advertis-
ers’ profits are increasing in the number of users. In the following the basic model
is presented.
8A problem in their model is that this gain for viewers/listeners is not included in the utility
function. The reason is that this would complicate the model dramatically and would change some
results.
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Platforms
There are two platforms i = 1, 2. Users cannot be excluded from using the plat-
forms. Therefore platforms cannot make profits from users directly. Instead plat-
forms make profits on advertisers. The profit function of platform i is
Πi = pini.
pi is the price that platform i is demanding from an advertiser for an advert and
ni is the number of advertisers on platform i. Each advertiser can only place one
advertisement and has to decide exclusively on which platform she wants to ad-
vertise. Thus there is rivalry for advertisers. It is assumed that platform pricing is
linear. We also assume that the costs of platforms are zero.9
Users
There is a mass of usersM . Users are uniformly distributed on a line with length
one where platform 1 is located at point 0 and platform 2 located at point 1. Each
user decides in favour of only one platform.10 The utility a user derives from
spending time t on platform i is v(t) where v(t) is an increasing and strictly con-
cave function. Users’ utility is decreasing in the number of advertisements ni on
platform i. The whole amount of disposable leisure time a user has is T¯ . So T¯ − t is
the time a user spends on doing other things during his leisure time. We normalize
the utility a user gets from doing this other things to 1 per unit of time.
The maximisation problem of a user who is located at x can be written as11
max
i,t
Ui = T¯ − t+ v(t)− γtnλi − τU |x− xi| (1)
γ is a measure of the nuisance costs of advertising and is the same for all users.
9This assumption is made for simplicity. Relaxing it would change the calculations but not the
qualitative results of the model.
10This formalisation fits themarket for Internet portals or TV broadcastingwell. Users or viewers
decide in favour of only one portal to do e-mailing or can only watch one programme at the same
time.
11The advantage of this formulation is that the decision of users how much time to spend on a
platform is separated from the decision which platform to use. See Anderson, de Palma & Thisse
(1992).
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The parameter λmeasures the curvature of the utility function in ni. It is assumed
that λ ≥ 1 so utility is weakly concave in ni. This is a realistic assumption, e.g.
one or two commercials on a homepage are not very disturbing but if a web site
is full of adverts this does disturb users a lot and the time which is spent on these
web site decreases drastically with additional commercials. Lastly, τU is the trans-
portation cost parameter and represents the degree of differentiation between both
platforms.
If a user has decided in favour of one platform differentiating with respect to t
yields
v′(t) = 1 + γnλi . (2)
t∗(ni) is implicitely given by (2) and represents the demand function for time on
platform i dependent on ni. From the Implicit Function Theorem we get the slope
of this demand function
∂t
∂ni
=
γλnλ−1i
v′′(t)
< 0. (3)
So the amount of time on platform i is decreasing in ni.
The indirect utility function of a user x is given by
U(x, ni) = T¯ − t(ni) + v(ti)− γt(ni)nλi − τU |x− xi|.
In the following we set T¯ − t(ni) + v(ti)− γt(ni)nλi = UB(ni) so U(x, ni) = UB(ni)−
τU |x − xi|. The marginal consumer who is indifferent between both platforms is
given by
xm =
1
2
+
1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2)).
We assume that tU is small enough so that in equilibrium all users use one plat-
form, e.g. τU ≤ 2UB(N/2). Thus a mass of Xi = Mxm chooses platform 1 and the
remaining massM(1− xm) chooses platform 2.
With advertising a producer informs users about the nature and the price of its
products. After having seen an advert a consumer knows his willingness to pay
for the good. It is assumed that this valuation is the same for all consumers and
is K with probability β and 0 with probability 1 − β. For simplicity it is assumed
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that it is the same for each advertiser’s good.12 This modeling follows Anderson
& Coate (2003). Although this formulation is specific it has the advantage that ad-
vertising cannot have a positive value for users because each producer will sell its
product at a price K. A lower price does not improve the possibility of a sale. Thus
the advertiser’s price is equivalent to consumers’ valuation and therefore a user’s
utility of getting aware of a new good is zero. The implication of this formulation
is that users do not get informational benefits from using a platform with much
advertising.
Advertisers
There is a mass of advertisers N . Ex ante advertisers are indifferent between both
platforms. Advertisers choose only one platform to advertise on. This assumption
represents an easy way to model that platforms have to compete for advertisers.13
If platform i is chosen by an advertiser her profit is
Pi = XiβKt(ni)− pi.
If she decides not to advertise she gets a profit of zero. The value of an adver-
tisement on platform i does positively depend on the time users spend on that
platform. The idea is that the more time a user spend on platform i the higher is
the possibility that he gets aware of that advertisement and buys the product in the
end. The gross value of an advertisement on i is thus XiβKt(ni). The advertiser
has to pay pi for an advertisement on i. For simplicity it is assumed that produc-
tion costs for advertisements and products are zero. Again this assumption does
not change the qualitative results.
12This stochastic structure is chosen to make the model more realistic and to express that not
every user has a positive valuation for each new good he gets aware of through advertising.
13The results of themodel do not depend on the assumption that advertisers single-home (choose
only one platform). What is necessary is that with a price change of platform i the number of
advertisers on platform j changes. So if platform i lowers pi, ni increases and nj decreases. One
can get the same results with the assumption that advertising firms multi-home (advertise on both
platforms) but have only a certain budget for advertising expenditures. So the last unit of this
budget can either be spent on one or the other platform. Thus advertisers multi-home but put
more commercials on the platform with the lower price.
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Game Structure
In the first stage the two platforms decide simultaneously about their prices p1
and p2. In the second stage advertisers decide on which platform they want to
advertise if on any and users decide how much time they spend on each platform.
Then profits and utilities are realised. This completes the description of the model.
In the analysis to follow we maintain the following assumption:
A1 : βK >
U ′′B(ni)
−(2 ∂t
∂ni
+ ∂
2t
∂n2
i
ni)
∀ni.
The role of this assumption is to guarantee that the gain from trading advertisers’
goods is high enough so that ni = 0 is never efficient, e.g. no advertising is never
efficient.
3 Efficiency
In this section the optimal number of advertisements on each platform is derived.
This result is later compared with the equilibrium outcome of the pricing game.
In the analysis of efficiency there are two effects to consider. Firstly, a higher num-
ber of advertisements increases the possibility of trade of advertisers’ products.
Secondly, a higher number of advertisements decreases users’ utility and exerts a
negative externality on other advertisers. Total welfare is given by
WF = MβKn1[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2))]t(n1)
+MβKn2[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n2)− UB(n1))]t(n2)
+MUB(n1)[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2))]
+MUB(n2)[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n2)− UB(n1))]
−τU ∫ 12+ 12τU (UB(n1)−UB(n2))0 xdx
−τU ∫ 11
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)−UB(n2))(1− x)dx.
(4)
The first two terms are the welfare from trading advertisers’ products. The third
and the fourth term represent the utility of users gross of transportation costs and
the fifth and the sixth term are the transportation costs. Differentiating (4) with
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respect to ni, i = 1, 2 yields the first order conditions
1
2τU
U ′B(ni)M [βKnit(ni) + UB(ni)]
+1
2
M [βKt(ni) + βKnit
′(ni) + U ′B(ni)]
− 1
2τU
U ′B(ni)M [βKnjt(nj) + UB(nj)] = 0,
i, j = 1, 2.
(5)
So the first order condition is the same for both n1 and n2. Thus it is efficient if n1 =
n2. The second order condition is globally satisfied because of A1. Simplifying (5)
yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1
If
βKt(N/2) + βK(N/2)t′(N/2) + U ′B(N/2) > 0, (6)
neffi =
N
2
is efficient.
Otherwise, the efficient number of advertisers neffi , i = 1, 2 is implicitly given by
βKt(ni) + βKnit
′(ni) + U ′B(ni) = 0. (7)
It is therefore efficient if advertisers allocate equally among platforms. The intu-
ition behind this is simple. If we look only at the gains from trade the externality
which one advertiser causes on another one is increasing convexly. So if one plat-
form has many advertisers users spend little time on this platform and thus many
advertisers gain little attention. To reduce this externality as well as possible it is
optimal that each platform has the same number of advertisers. Transportation
costs can be reduced with an even partition as well. If βK is high which means
that the probability and the welfare gains from trade are high all producers should
advertise and ni = N/2. If these gains are lower compared to the utility loss of
users, n1 + n2 < N .
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4 Nash Equilibrium
In this section we solve for the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game.
Since platforms can only quote prices to advertisers and are not differentiated from
their point of view we are in a standard Bertrand game. The difference is that with
a negative externality one platform cannot win all advertisers by undercutting its
competitor’s price. The platform with the lower price gets more advertisers but
this results in a higher externality on all of them and reduces their profits. It is
thus optimal for some advertisers to stay on the other platform. Thus platforms
earn positive profits in equilibrium.14
It turns out that the model is solvable in a similar way as the product differentia-
tion model of Hotelling.
To see this let us assume first that all N producers advertise. Since all advertisers
are the same in equilibrium each advertiser must be indifferent between platform
1 and 2. If this would not be the case one platform can increase its price without
losing any advertisers which cannot be an equilibrium. Thus we can determine
the marginal advertiser who is indifferent between both platforms. She described
by
MβKt(n1)[
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(N − n1))]− p1 =
MβKt(N − n1)[12 + 12τU (UB(N − n1)− UB(n1))]− p2
(8)
The left hand side is the profit of an advertiser on platform 1 and the right hand
side the profit of an advertiser on platform 2 if the number of advertisers are n1
and n2 = N − n1.
Contrary to standard analysis it is not possible to solve (8) for n1 because users’
utility is concave in n1. To get a solution (8) is solved for p1 which yields a max-
14It should bementioned that this result is completely different in amodel with positive external-
ities. If in such models buyers (in our model advertisers) can coordinate on the platform that gives
them the highest surplus prices would be driven down to zero because of the standard Bertrand
argument. For an overview of this literature see Farrell & Klemperer (2001) or Katz & Shapiro
(1994).
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imisation problem of platform 1 of
maxn1 Πi = {p2 +MβKt(n1)[12 + 12τU (UB(n1)− UB(N − n1))]−
MβKt(N − n1)[12 + 12τU (UB(N − n1)− UB(n1))]}n1.
(9)
Maximising profits for both firms yields two first order conditions. These first
order conditions in combination with equation (8) and equation (8) with 1 and 2
reversed yields the equilibrium values of ni and pi. After applying the Envelope
Theorem, U ′B(ni) = −γλnλ−1i t(ni), we get
n∗i =
N
2
(which is obvious because of symmetry) and
p∗i = βKMNγλ(N/2)
λ−1[
t(N/2)2
tU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2))
].
It remains to calculate the equilibrium if n1 + n2 < N .15
The equilibrium of the game is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2
If τU ≤ τ 1U = (N/2)
λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
in the unique Nash equilibrium n∗i is im-
plicitly given by
t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni − t(ni)
2γλnλi
τU
= 0, (10)
where a unique solution n∗i ∈ (0, N/2) exists, and
p∗i =
MβKt(n∗i )
2
. (11)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i =
MβKt(n∗i )
2
n∗i . (12)
15Themethod of solution is similar to a standard product differentiation gamewhere consumers’
gross surplus from buying is so low that firms are local monopolists. See e.g. Gabszewicz & Thisse
(1986).
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If τ 1U < τU ≤ τ 2U = 4(N/2)
λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2)+
2γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
in the unique Nash equilibrium n∗i =
N
2
and
p∗i =
MβKt(N/2)
2
. (13)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i =
MβKt(N/2)
2
N/2. (14)
If τU > τ 2U in the unique Nash equilibrium
n∗i =
N
2
(15)
and
p∗i = βKMNγλ(N/2)
λ−1[
t(N/2)2
τU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2))
] (16)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i = βKMNγλ(N/2)
λ[
t(N/2)2
τU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2))
]. (17)
Proof
When calculating the marginal advertiser in equation (8) it was assumed that all
producers advertise. But this is only the case if it pays the ’Nth’ producer to ad-
vertise on a platform instead of not advertising and getting profits of zero.
Thus with a price p∗i = βKMNγλ(N/2)λ−1[
t(N/2)2
τU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2)) ] this is only the case
if
M
2
βKt(N/2) > βKMNγλ(N/2)λ−1[
t(N/2)2
τU
− 1
2v′′(t(N/2))
]
or
τU > τ
2
U = 4
(N/2)λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2) + 2γλ(N/2)
λ
v′′(t(N/2))
.
The next question is what the optimal price of a platform is if it does not have to
compete for advertisers because n1+n2 < N . In this case the number of advertisers
on a platform i depends on pi and is given byMβKt(ni)[12+
1
2τU
(UB(ni)−UB(nj))]−
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pi = 0. So the advertiser ni is the last one whose profit is not negative given a price
of pi. Thus the profit of platform i is
Π = MβKt(ni)ni[
1
2
+
1
2τU
(UB(ni)− UB(nj))]. (18)
Maximising this with respect to ni for both platforms yields that n∗i is given by
t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni − t(ni)
2γλnλi
τU
= 0.
which is equation (10).
If ni = 0 the left hand side of (10) is positive because t(0) > 0. If ni = N/2 the left
hand side is negative because profit function (18) is only relevant if τU < τ 1U . Thus
a solution with n∗i ∈ (0, N/2) exists. Since all terms of (10) are continuous functions
of ni this solution is unique.
This n∗i equals
N
2
if
t(N/2) +
∂t(N/2)
∂ni
N/2− t(N/2)
2γλ(N/2)λ
τU
= 0
or
τU =
(N/2)λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2) + γλ(N/2)
λ
v′′(t(N/2))
= τ 1U .
So for τU ≤ τ 1U = (N/2)
λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
n∗i is given by t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni − t(ni)
2γλnλi
τU
= 0 and
p∗i =
MβKt(n∗i )
2
.
It remains to calculate what happens if If τ 1U < τU ≤ τ 2U = 4(N/2)
λγλt(N/2)2
t(N/2)+
2γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
. In this
case n∗1 = n∗2 = N/2 and both platforms set their prices such that the advertisers
have zero utility, e.g.
p∗i =
MβKt(N/2)
2
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which is equation (13).
q.e.d.
The profit function is continuous but has two kinks. In the following we provide
some comparative static analyses. First let us look at a change in the transportation
cost parameter τU .
Proposition 3
Platform profits are increasing in τU as long as τU ≤ τ 1U .
Profits are independent of τU if τ 1U < τU ≤ τ 2U and profits are decreasing
in τU if τU > τ 2U .
Proof
If τU ≤ τ 1U profit is given by (12) and the optimal number of advertisers is given
by (10). As was shown in the proof of Proposition 2 (10) is the first order con-
dition for the maximisation problem of platform i with respect to ni. Apply-
ing the Implicit Function Theorem to (10) yields that sign( ∂ni
∂τU
) = sign(∂(10)
∂τU
) =
− 1
2(τU )2
βKMnit(ni)U
′
B(ni), which greater than zero. Differentiating equation (12)
with respect to τU gives ∂Πi∂τU =
MβK
2
(t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni)
∂ni
∂τU
. So sign( ∂Πi
∂τU
) = sign(t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni). By equation (10), t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni − t(ni)
2γλnλi
τU
= 0. Since the last term of the
left hand side is negative t(ni) +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni > 0which yields ∂Πi∂τU > 0.
If τ 1U < τU ≤ τ 2U profit is given by (14). Here n∗i = N2 and therefore (14) is indepen-
dent of τU .
If τU > τ 2U profit is given by (17). In this case
∂Πi
∂tU
= −βKMNγλ(N/2)λ[ t(N/2)2
(τU )2
] < 0.
q.e.d.
The intuition behind this result is the following. τU represents the level of differ-
entiation between the two platforms from the perspective of the users. If τU is
small platforms have to compete fiercely for users. They do this by reducing their
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amount of advertising. Thus prices are high and only few producers advertise. If
τU increases prices decrease. But profit is rising because more advertiser choose to
advertise on the platforms.16 In this region platforms do not compete for advertis-
ers since n1 + n2 < N . But when τU reaches τ 1U all producers are advertising and
competition for advertisers starts. In the region between τ 1U and τ 2U profits stay the
same since it does not pay for one platform to lower prices. But if τU rises further
competition for advertisers lowers prices. The reason is that it pays platforms to
attract more advertisers because fewer consumers will switch to the other plat-
form. This strategic effect drives prices down. But also profits are lower because
both firms lower their prices and n∗i stays the same.
This shows that in a two-sided market with negative externalities a lower degree
of competition on one side can increase the competition on the other side and lead
to lower profits. This is never possible in a standard market with only one side.
It is also possible to derive a comparative static result with respect to γ, the nui-
sance cost of advertising.
Proposition 4
If τU ≤ τ 2U platform profits are decreasing in γ but if τU > τ 2U the effect
of a change in γ on profits is ambiguous.
Proof
First look at the case τU ≤ τ 1U . Equation (10) is the first order condition of the
maximisation problem of platform i. By applying the Implicit Function Theorem
we have
sign(∂ni
∂γ
)
= sign(∂t(ni)
∂γ
+ ni
∂2t(ni)
∂ni∂γ
+ niU
′
B(ni)
1
τU
∂t(ni)
∂γ
)
= sign(n
λ
i (1+λ)τU−n2λi t(ni)γλ
v′′(t(ni))
)
= sign(−(1 + λ)τU + nλi γλt(ni)).
Multiplying (10) with τU
t(ni)
yields
τU +
∂t(ni)
∂ni
ni
τU
t(ni)
− t(ni)γλnλi = 0.
16A similar result is obtained by Barros, Kind & Sorgard (2003) in a different model.
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Thus τU > t(ni)γλnλi and therefore τU(1 + λ) > t(ni)γλnλi . This shows that
∂ni
∂γ
< 0.
If τU ≤ τ 1U profit is given by (12). Differentiating (12) with respect to γ yields
∂Πi
∂γ
= MβK
2
[t(ni)
∂ni
∂γ
+ ∂t(ni)
∂γ
ni].
Differentiating ∂t(ni)
∂γ
yields n
λ
i
v′′(t(ni)
< 0 and thus ∂Πi
∂γ
< 0.
If τ 1U < τU ≤ τ 2U profit is given by (14). Differentiating yields ∂Πi∂γ = MβKN4 ∂t(ni)∂γ < 0.
If τU > τ 2U profit is given by (17). Differentiating profit with respect to γ yields
sign(∂Πi
∂γ
) = sign(2t(ni)2(v′′(t(ni)))2−t(ni)v′′(t(ni))+4t(ni)γv′′(t(ni))2 ∂t(ni)∂γ +γτU ∂t(ni)∂γ v′′′(t(ni))).
The first two terms are positive the third term is negative and the fourth term is
unclear. So profit may increase or decrease in γ.
q.e.d.
γ represents the nuisance costs of advertising. So one would guess that profit
should decrease in γ because consumers spend less time on the platforms. Propo-
sition 4 states that this is only true if platforms do not compete for advertisers, i.e.
if τU is low. In this case each user spends less time on platforms which results in
a lower possibility of trade of advertisers’ goods and thus in lower prices. But if
τU is high and platforms compete for advertisers, profit might increase in γ. The
intuition is that with a high τU platforms have an incentive to lower their prices
to attract new advertisers. This reduces profits. With a higher nuisance cost this
effect is dampened because each platform makes lower profits on new advertisers
and thus prices might be higher compared with a lower γ. Thus a higher γ causes
two effects on prices. The first is that users are more disturbed by commercials
which reduces prices. The second is that competition is reduced which increases
prices. The consequences on profits are therefore not clear.
Now let us turn to the comparison of the Nash equilibrium with the efficient out-
come.
Proposition 5
If βKt(N/2) + βKN/2t′(N/2) + U ′B(N/2) > 0 advertising is efficient if
τU ≥ τ 1U and there is too little advertising if τU < τ 1U .
If there exists ni s.t.βKt(ni) + βKnit′(ni) + U ′B(ni) = 0, there can be too
much or too little advertising in equilibrium.
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There is too little advertising if τU < min[τ 1U , βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i )] and too
much if τU > min[τ 1U , βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i )].
Only if τU = βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i ) ≤ τ 1U the equilibrium is efficient.
Proof
From Proposition 1 the optimal number of advertisers on each platform is given
by (6) or (7). First look at the case where there exists an ni < N/2 such that (7)
holds.
In the Nash equilibrium of the game neqi = N/2 if τU > τ 1U . Thus it follows that
neqi > n
eff
i if τU > τ 1U .
If τU < τ 1U , n
eq
i is given by the first order condition (10). If we insert n
eff
i in this first
order condition we get from (7)
γλt(neffi )(n
eff
i )
λ−1
βK
− γλt(n
eff
i )
2neffi
τU

>
=
<
 0
or
τU

>
=
<
 βKneffi t(neffi ).
So if τU > βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i ) the left hand side of equation (10) is than zero at n
eq
i but
it is greater zero at neffi . Thus n
eq
i > n
eff
i .
If τU < βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i ) equation (10) is zero at n
eq
i but it is lower than zero at n
eff
i .
Thus neqi < n
eff
i .
It therefore follows that neqi > n
eff
i if τU > min[τ 1U , βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i )] and n
eq
i < n
eff
i if
τU < min[τ 1U , βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i )]. Only in the case when τU = βKn
eff
i t(n
eff
i ) ≤ τ 1U the
equilibrium is efficient.
Now look at the case where neffi = N/2. We know that in equilibrium n
eq
i = N/2 if
τU ≥ τ 1U and neqi < N/2 if τU < τ 1U .
The proposition follows.
q.e.d.
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This shows that it depends on the level of τU whether the equilibrium is efficient or
not.17 If τU is low competition for users is fierce and therefore advertising levels are
low. Platforms do not take into account the users’ utility loss from an additional
commercial but only the indirect externality on all advertisers. The reason is that
only this indirect externality can be reflected in their pricing behaviour. If compe-
tition for users is harsh many users switch to the competitor if one platform has an
additional advertiser. Thus the advertising level is lower than the efficient level.
From (6) and (7) we know that τU does not play a role in determining the efficient
advertising level. But it is the important variable for platform competition. In the
case when not all producers should advertise there can be too much advertising if
τU is high because competition for users is low.
If all producers should advertise there can only be too little advertising. This is the
case if competition is fierce with the same line of reasoning as before.
5 Pricing Behaviour of Internet Portals
In this section we discuss the pricing behaviour of two internet portals, namely
AOL and GMX. We argue that the structure of their commercial prices fits the
results of the preceding section quite well.
Both AOL and GMX are portals where members have access to free e-mail, get
informed about cheap offers of products and can inform themselves about specific
topics in so called affinity groups. It is costless to become a member of theses
portals. The portals get revenues from members only if these buy some services
from the portals, like sending SMS or printing pictures. Usually these services are
sold at low prices.
The most important source for profits of the portals is advertising. There are dif-
ferent forms of advertising on both portals but the most common ones are banners
on their web site. AOL sells a full-size banner on its homepage for 15 Euros per
thousand eye-balls, a half-size banner is sold for 10 Euros. A full-size banner on
17In a model of TV-advertising a similar result is obtained by Kind, Nilssen & Sorgard (2003).
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the logout-page of AOL costs only 7 Euros, a half-size banner 5 Euros.18 A simi-
lar pricing structure can be observed at GMX.19 At GMX a logout banner costs 15
Euros while a comparable banner on the homepage costs 24 Euros.20
Where does this difference come from? Since these prices are per thousand eye-
balls one cannot argue that homepage prices are higher because more people are
watching the homepage. Instead a reason can be found from the arguments of the
preceding section. To attract advertisers portals have to attract users at first. But
before a user decides which portal to use he will compare the homepages of the
portals. If one site is plain while the other one is full of commercials while both
portals can be used for free he will most likely decide in favour of the plain one.
Thus competition for users takes mainly place on the homepages. This can explain
the high prices for the homepage banners. Thus homepages of portals do usually
have few advertisements on it.
By contrast, only if a user has already decided to use a portal he will see the logout
page. So there is no more competition for users and prices for logout-banners are
cheap. For example, on the portal GMX usually four advert banners are on the
logout page but at most one the start page.
This provides some evidence that the degree of competition for users has a high
influence on commercial prices.
6 User Charge
In some markets it is not only possible for platforms to make money on advertis-
ers but to charge users for the consumption of platforms’ services as well. Exam-
ples are pay-TV channels and newspapers. For example in Europe direct broad-
cast satellite channels like Canal Plus or Premiere are partially financed by user
charges. This is also of policy interest since in the TV case it is becoming techni-
cally easier to exclude viewers.
18See http://www.aol.de/mediaspace/preise/preistabelle/contentview.jsp
19See http://media.gmx.net/de/cgi/preise?LANG=de&AREA=homepage.
20Prices are higher at GMX than at AOL because banners are bigger and the form of advertising
is fancier.
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In our model the possibility of a user charge can be incorporated in an easy way.
In the following we assume that each platform i can charge users a fee ci for its
services. Then platform profit is given by
Πi = pini +Xici.
The indirect utility of a user who is located at x and uses platform i is given by
U(x, ni) = T − t(ni) + v(ti)− γt(ni)nλi − ci − τU |x− xi|.
Again, as in Section 2 we set T − t(ni) + v(ti) − γt(ni)nλi = UB(ni) so U(x, ni) =
UB(ni) − ci − τU |x − xi|. The assumption that all users choose one platform is
maintained so τU ≤ 2(UB(N/2)− c∗i ).
The marginal user is then given by
xm =
1
2
+
1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2) + c2 − c1).
Conducting the same analysis as before gives a maximisation problem of platform
1 of
maxn1,c1 Π1 = {p2 + βKMt(n1)[12 + 12τU (UB(n1)− UB(N − n1)) + c2 − c1]−
MβKt(N − n1)[12 + 12τU (UB(N − n1)− UB(n1))]}n1
+c1M(
1
2
+ 1
2τU
(UB(n1)− UB(n2) + c2 − c1))
if all producers advertise. Formulating the first order condition and solving for pi
and ci yields
p∗i = Mγλ(N/2)
λ−1[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
]
and
c∗i = τU − βKNt(N/2).21
21For the moment we assume that ci can be positive or negative.
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The profit of the platform is given by
Π∗i = Mγλ(N/2)
λ[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
] +
M
2
[τU − t(N/2)NβK].
Comparing this profit with the profit without a user charge we get
Πwith charge = Πwithout charge + [1− t(N/2)
NβK
τU
][Mλγt(N/2)(N/2)λ + τU
M
2
].
Thus the profit with user charge is higher if 1− t(N/2)NβK
τU
> 0. But this is exactly
the formula for the user charge to be positive.
The profits in the case that not all producers advertise are computed in the same
way as in Section 3. This leads to the following equilibrium.
Proposition 6
If βK ≤ (N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i is implicitly given by
t(ni) + ni
∂t
∂ni
− t(ni)n
λ−1
i γλ
βK
= 0, (19)
where a unique solution n∗i ∈ (0, N/2) exists, and
p∗i =
M
2
βKt(n∗i ) (20)
and
c∗i = τU − βKn∗i t(n∗i ). (21)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i =
1
2
MτU (22)
If (N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
< βK ≤ 2(N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i =
N
2
,
p∗i =
M
2
βKt(N/2) (23)
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and
c∗i = τU − βKNt(N/2). (24)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i =
1
2
MτU . (25)
If βK > 2(N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i =
N
2
,
p∗i = Mγλ(N/2)
λ−1[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
] (26)
and
c∗i = τU − βKNt(N/2). (27)
Profits of the platforms are
Π∗i = Mγλ(N/2)
λ[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
] +
M
2
[τU − t(N/2)NβK]. (28)
Proof
If platforms set prices p∗i = Mγλ(N/2)λ−1[t(N/2) − t(N/2) NβK2v′′(t(N/2)) ] the condition
under which N producers advertise is given by
M
2
βKt(N/2)− p∗i = Mγλ(N/2)λ−1[t(N/2)−
NβK
2v′′(t(N/2))
] > 0
or
βK >
2(N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2) + γλ(N/2)
λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
.
In this case p∗i = and c∗i are given by (26) and (27).
If not all N producers advertise there is no competition for advertisers. Thus each
platform set the price pi = M2 βKt(ni). The maximisation problem of platform i is
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thus
max
ni,ci
Πi = ni
M
2
βKt(ni)
which yields that n∗i is implicitly given by (19) and c∗i = τU − βKNt(n∗i ).
For the same reason is in the proof of Proposition 2 a unique solution n∗i ∈ (0, N/2)
exists.
Inserting ni = N/2 in (19) gives t(N/2) + N/2 ∂t∂ni − t(N/2)
(N/2)λ−1γλ
βK
= 0 or βK =
(N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
.
Thus if βK ≤ (N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i is given by (19). If βK >
(N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then
n∗i = N/2 and p∗i = and c∗i are given by (23) and (24).
q.e.d.
The profit can now be compared with the profit if a user charge is not possible.
Proposition 7
Suppose that platforms can set an unrestricted user charge. If this user
charge is positive in equilibrium profits are higher than without the
user charge.
Proof
To prove the proposition we have to compare the highest profit without a user
charge with the lowest profit with user charge.
Because of Proposition 2 the highest profitwithout a user charge is given byΠwithout charge =
MβKt(N/2)
2
N/2.
The lowest profit with user charge is Πwith charge =
1
2
MτU . This is the case be-
causeMγλ(N/2)λ[t(N/2)− NβK
2v′′(t(N/2)) ]+
M
2
[τU−t(N/2)NβK], which is the profit with
user charge if βK > 2(N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
, is higher than 1
2
MτU if βK >
2(N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
2v′′(t(N/2))
.
Now comparing Πwith charge =
1
2
MτU with Πwithout charge =
MβKt(N/2)
2
N/2
yields that Πwith charge > Πwithout charge if and only if τU > N/2βKt(N/2).
But this exactly the condition for the user fee to be positive.
q.e.d.
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We have shown that profits always increase if the user charge is positive. But if it is
negative profits might be lower than without this possibility. The intuition behind
this result is the following. If platforms have the possibility to set a user charge
there are two different ways to do that. The first is to set a higher commercial price
to get rid of some advertisers and then make profits on users with a positive user
charge. This is the case if τU > βKNt(N/2). Both platforms set a higher p∗i so
none of them loses many advertisers. But they set c∗i > 0 as well which results in
higher profits. The second possibility is to subsidise users with a negative fee in
order to attract more advertisers.22 But since both platforms do so in equilibrium
they reduce their advertiser price as well and profits are lower than without a user
charge. Thus a prisoner’s dilemma situation arises.23 Profits would be higher if
the additional instrument of the user charge were not available.
Differentiating with respect to τU yields that
∂Π∗i
∂τU
= M
2
> 0. So in contrast to the
case without user charge profits are always increasing in τU . The reason is that p∗i
is independent of τU while c∗i is increasing in τU . Thus if platforms can charge both
sides of the market the degree of competition on one side is only reflected in the
price of that side.
Let us turn now to the welfare analysis.
Proposition 8
If platforms can set an unrestricted user charge the equilibrium is effi-
cient.
Proof
If βK ≤ (N/2)λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then in equilibrium n∗i is given by (19). But since U ′B(ni) =
−γλnλ−1i t(ni) equation (19) is the same as βKt(ni)+βKnit′(ni)+U ′B(ni) = 0which
is equation (7), the condition for efficiency if neffi < N/2.
22A similar way of reasoning is given by Rochet & Tirole (2003). In two-sided markets the plat-
forms charge prices such that the side with the higher demand elasticity is subsidised by the side
with the lower demand elasticity.
23Similar effects are at work in Anderson & Leruth (1993) and Thisse & Vives (1988) where an
additional pricing instrument hurt firms.
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If βK > (N/2)
λ−1γλt(N/2)
t(N/2)+
γλ(N/2)λ
v′′(t(N/2))
then n∗i = N/2. Routine manipulations of the inequality
yields that this inequality is the same as βKt(N/2)+βKN/2t′(N/2)+U ′B(N/2) > 0.
But this is inequality (6), the condition for efficiency if neffi = N/2.
q.e.d.
Why does the additional instrument of a user charge lead to the efficient outcome?
The intuition is that platforms now take users’ utility directly into account and not
only indirectly in the commercial prices. Since there is competition for users both
platforms set the fees in such a way that users allocate efficiently. On the side of
the advertisers there is Bertrand competition (although profits are positive). Ad-
vertisers are allocated efficiently as well. The reason is that the efficient allocation
helps both firms to get higher revenue. Thus with a second instrument at hands
competition for users and advertisers leads to the efficient outcome.
Up to now we assumed that the user charge is unrestricted so it can be negative.
But in many situations this is not practicable. TV watchers are not paid by stations
or internet users are not subsidised by portals. If the user fee is restricted to be
positive this means in our analysis that c∗i = max{0, τU − βKNt(n∗i )}. If τU <
βKNt(n∗i ) this constraint is binding. In this case it would be optimal for platforms
in a symmetric equilibrium to set c∗i = 0. But this exactly what we observe in many
markets. Take again the case of an internet portal. For them it would be technically
no problem to charge users if they want to get access to their site. Instead they do
not require users to pay a fee in order to attract many users and make profits on
advertisers.
In terms of welfare if a user charge has to be positive the equilibrium is no longer
generally efficient but only if τU > βKNt(n∗i ). So if the constraint on c∗i is binding
the result is the same as in the case without a user charge. To reach efficiency both
pricing instruments have to be unrestricted.24
24For a discussion of policy implications for two-sided markets see Evans (2004).
Two-Sided Markets with Negative Externalities 28
7 Conclusion
This paper analysed a model of platform competition in which each advertiser
exerts a direct negative externality on users and indirect one on all other adver-
tisers on the same platform. It was shown that the number of advertisements in
equilibrium can be too high or too low compared with the efficient one. Profits
of platforms can increase if they become less differentiated because this leads to
lower competition on the advertisers’ side. If platforms can set a user charge as
well profits increase only if this charge is positive in equilibrium. A prisoner’s
dilemma result is possible. But welfare is always higher with a user charge. We
have also given anecdotal evidence that supports our results in an example of pric-
ing behaviour of internet portals .
An interesting suggestion for further research might be to analyse the dynamics
of such a two-sided market. Usually if people are used to one internet portal or
read a newspaper for several years they would not switch easily if another one
has fewer advertisements. People form habits. It would be interesting to analyse
how such habit formation might change the results. A new platform which enters
the market after the others (such as Google in the search engine case) needs a very
low level of advertising to induce consumers to switch. This is what was actually
observed for Google. So the question arises if this low level of advertising will
persist or vanish over time.
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